After she'd gotten blood drawn and sent it off for testing of the free-floating DNA in her blood, a nurse called and said there'd been some kind of error and the test hadn't produced reportable results. So Aukstikalnis went in and had her blood drawn again.
I have always downloaded the documents from ancestry, and then renamed them in the form 1876census_Williamjones family , and filed them in the Jones-William folder. But I do wonder if the name that they have when downloaded has any relevance that I might find useful in the future?
I have tried to deal with Ancestry and always find they want more and more money for everything. Also, I have gone on genealogy sites thinking they are free and they turn out to be owned by Ancestry. I have given up on dealing with them to get any kind of fair priced help with my genealogy. By the way, you ask how Christian is that, I believe they think Jesus is an angel not the Son of God. So technically, they are not Christian. If you belong to a library in your city, you can get a lot of free help with genealogy like Heritage Quest. You just need a library card and they will show you how to download it. That site can lead you to other more reasonable Family Tree sites. Bea
After addressing the appropriate content of tales, Socrates discusses whether simple or imitative narrative should be used by poets and guardians. He determines that mimetic poetry is dangerous because it encourages people to imitate bad as well as good behavior and supports the violation of the one man-one job principle (395c). But if poets and guardians are to imitate (which they doubtlessly will since Socrates' whole discussion of the importance of good tales relies on the idea that children will imitate good examples), they must copy those virtues which they have been taught since childhood (courage, moderation, holiness, freedom) (395c). Socrates says, "Imitations, if they are practiced continually from youth onwards, become established as habits and nature, in body and sounds and in thought" (395d). Therefore, the correct style of narrative for both guardians and poets is mostly non-imitative, but allows for some imitation of good men (396d). Socrates then says that the preference for non-imitative poets excludes the most loved and entertaining poets from the city (397e-398a), in favor of more austere and less-pleasing poets. Whereas Glaucon was unwilling to give up the "relishes" which he loves (372c), Adeimantus, Socrates' partner for this part of the discussion, willingly gives up his favorite poets and agrees that poets must be less pleasing.
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This essay focuses on personal love, or the love of particular personsas such. Part of the philosophical task in understanding personal loveis to distinguish the various kinds of personal love. For example, theway in which I love my wife is seemingly very different from the way Ilove my mother, my child, and my friend. This task has typicallyproceeded hand-in-hand with philosophical analyses of these kinds ofpersonal love, analyses that in part respond to various puzzles aboutlove. Can love be justified? If so, how? What is the value of personallove? What impact does love have on the autonomy of both the lover andthe beloved?
The second criticism involves a substantive view concerning love. Partof what it is to love someone, these opponents say, is to have concernfor him for his sake. However, union views make such concernunintelligible and eliminate the possibility of both selfishness andself-sacrifice, for by doing away with the distinction between myinterests and your interests they have in effect turned your interestsinto mine and vice versa (Soble 1997; see also Blum 1980,1993). Some advocates of union views see this as a point in theirfavor: we need to explain how it is I can have concern for peopleother than myself, and the union view apparently does this byunderstanding your interests to be part of my own. And Delaney,responding to an apparent tension between our desire to be lovedunselfishly (for fear of otherwise being exploited) and our desire tobe loved for reasons (which presumably are attractive to our lover andhence have a kind of selfish basis), says (1996, p. 346):
A third kind of view of love understands love to be a distinctive modeof valuing a person. As the distinction between eros andagape in Section 1 indicates, there are at least two ways to construe this in terms ofwhether the lover values the beloved because she is valuable, orwhether the beloved comes to be valuable to the lover as a result ofher loving him. The former view, which understands the lover asappraising the value of the beloved in loving him, is thetopic of Section 4.1, whereas the latter view, which understands her as bestowingvalue on him, will be discussed in Section 4.2.
Velleman (1999, 2008) offers an appraisal view of love, understandinglove to be fundamentally a matter of acknowledging and responding in adistinctive way to the value of the beloved. (For a very differentappraisal view of love, see Kolodny 2003.) Understanding this morefully requires understanding both the kind of value of the beloved towhich one responds and the distinctive kind of response to such valuethat love is. Nonetheless, it should be clear that what makes anaccount be an appraisal view of love is not the mere fact that love isunderstood to involve appraisal; many other accounts do so, and it istypical of robust concern accounts, for example (cf. the quote fromTaylor above, Section 3). Rather, appraisal views are distinctive inunderstanding love to consist in that appraisal.
In articulating the kind of value love involves, Velleman, followingKant, distinguishes dignity from price. To have a price, asthe economic metaphor suggests, is to have a value that can becompared to the value of other things with prices, such that it isintelligible to exchange without loss items of the same value. Bycontrast, to have dignity is to have a value such thatcomparisons of relative value become meaningless. Material goods arenormally understood to have prices, but we persons have dignity: nosubstitution of one person for another can preserve exactly the samevalue, for something of incomparable worth would be lost (and gained)in such a substitution.
Given this, Velleman claims that love is similarly a response to thedignity of persons, and as such it is the dignity of the object of ourlove that justifies that love. However, love and respect are differentkinds of responses to the same value. For love arrests not ourself-love but rather
Nonetheless, there is a kernel of truth in the bestowal view: there issurely something right about the idea that love is creative and notmerely a response to antecedent value, and accounts of love thatunderstand the kind of evaluation implicit in love merely in terms ofappraisal seem to be missing something. Precisely what may be missedwill be discussed below in Section 6.
Given these problems with the accounts of love as valuing, perhaps weshould turn to the emotions. For emotions just are responses toobjects that combine evaluation, motivation, and a kind ofphenomenology, all central features of the attitude of love.
By focusing on such emotionally complex histories, emotion complexviews differ from most alternative accounts of love. For alternativeaccounts tend to view love as a kind of attitude we take toward ourbeloveds, something we can analyze simply in terms of our mental stateat the moment. By ignoring this historical dimension of love in providing an accountof what love is, alternative accounts have a hard time providingeither satisfying accounts of the sense in which our identities asperson are at stake in loving another or satisfactory solutions toproblems concerning how love is to be justified (cf. Section 6, especially the discussion of fungibility).
One way to understand the question of why we love is as asking forwhat the value of love is: what do we get out of it? One kind ofanswer, which has its roots in Aristotle, is that having lovingrelationships promotes self-knowledge insofar as your beloved acts asa kind of mirror, reflecting your character back to you (Badhwar,2003, p. 58). Of course, this answer presupposes that we cannotaccurately know ourselves in other ways: that left alone, our sense ofourselves will be too imperfect, too biased, to help us grow andmature as persons. The metaphor of a mirror also suggests that ourbeloveds will be in the relevant respects similar to us, so thatmerely by observing them, we can come to know ourselves better in away that is, if not free from bias, at least more objective thanotherwise. 2b1af7f3a8